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Abstract. In this paper we study a type of games regularized by the relative entropy, where the players’ strategies are
coupled through a random environment variable. Besides the existence and the uniqueness of equilibria of such games, we
prove that the marginal laws of the corresponding mean-field Langevin systems can converge towards the games’ equilibria in
different settings. As applications, the dynamic games can be treated as games on a random environment when one treats the
time horizon as the environment. In practice, our results can be applied to analysing the stochastic gradient descent algorithm
for deep neural networks in the context of supervised learning as well as for the generative adversarial networks.
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1. Introduction. The approximation of the equilibria is at the heart of the game theory. The classic
literature introduces a natural relation connecting the equilibria of the games and the optima of the sequen-
tial decision problems. This leads to a fruitful research on the topics such as approachability, regret and
calibration, see the survey by V. Perchet [26] and the books by N. Cesa-Bianchi and G. Lugosi [3] and by
D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine [12]. In particular, the gradient-based strategy often plays a crucial rule
in approximating the equilibria. In the present paper we study the analog to the gradient-based strategy
in the continuous-time setting, namely, we aim at approximating the equilibria of games using the diffusion
processes encoded with the gradients of potential functions.
Consider a game with n players. The mixed Nash equilibrium is defined to be a collection of probability
measures (ν∗,i)i=1,··· ,n such that
(1.1) ν∗,i ∈ argmin
νi
∫
f i(x1, · · · , xn)νi(dxi)
∏
j 6=i
ν∗,j(dxj),
which means that each player can no longer improve his performance by making a unilateral change of
strategy. Note that in this classical setting, the potential function of each player
νi 7→ F i(νi, (νj)j 6=i) := ∫ f i(x1, · · · , xn)νi(dxi)∏
j 6=i
νj(dxj)
is linear. In this paper we shall allow the potential function to be nonlinear in view of the applications, in
particular, to the neural networks (see section 4). As another generalization to the classic theory, we consider
games on a random environment. Introduce a space of environment Y and fix a probability measure m on it.
We urge each player to choose a strategy among the probability measures νi on the product space Rni × Y
such that the marginal law of νi on Y, νiY , matches the fixed distribution m. Typically, in our framework
we consider the game of which the Nash equilibrium is a collection of probability measures (ν∗,i)i=1,··· ,n on
the product spaces such that
(1.2) ν∗,i ∈ argmin
νi:νiY =m
∫
f i(x1, · · · , xn, y)νi(dxi|y)
∏
j 6=i
ν∗,j(dxj |y)m(dy) + σ
2
2
H(νi|Leb×m),
where ν(·|y) denotes the conditional probability given y, and we add the relative entropy H as a regularizer.
In contrast to the conventional definition of the Nash equilibrium (1.1), where the players’ strategies are
uncorrelated, in our setting the strategies of the players are allowed to be coupled through the environment.
Moreover, the general framework of the present paper goes beyond the particular game (1.2), by allowing
the cost function to be nonlinear in (νi)i=1,··· ,n. As an application, we observe (Example 2.4) that relaxed
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dynamic games can be viewed as games on random environment, where the environment Y is the time
horizon.
One of our main contributions is the first order condition of the optimization on the probability space
given a marginal constraint (Theorem 3.1), which naturally provides a necessary condition for being a Nash
equilibrium of a game on random environment (Corollary 3.3). This result is a generalization to the first
order condition in Proposition 2.4 in [16] for the optimization on the probability space without marginal
constraint. The key ingredient for this analysis is the linear functional derivative δFδν , first introduced for the
variational calculus and recently popularized by the study on the mean-field games, see e.g. Cardaliaguet et
al. [1], Delarue et al. [7, 8], Chassagneux et al. [4]. Roughly speaking, we prove that
(1.3) if ν∗ ∈ argminν:νY =m F (ν) + σ
2
2 H(ν|Leb×m),
then ∇x δFδν (ν∗, x, y) + σ
2
2 ∇x ln ν∗(x|y) = 0, for all x, m-a.s. y.
Besides the first order condition for the Nash equilibrium, we also provide sufficient conditions on the linear
functional derivative so that the game on a random environment admits a (unique) equilibrium.
The first order equation in (1.3) clearly links the minimizer ν∗ (or the Nash equilibrium in the context
of games) to the invariant measure of a system of diffusion processes, see (2.2) below. Since the dynamics
of the diffusion processes depends on their marginal distributions (in other word, McKean-Vlasov diffusion,
see [24, 27]) and involves the gradients of the potential functions, we name the system mean-field Langevin
(MFL) system. Further, we study the different settings where the marginal laws of the MFL system converge
to the unique invariant measure, which, due to the first order condition, must coincide with the Nash
equilibrium of the game on random environment. In the case with small dependence on the marginal laws,
we prove the exponential ergodicity of the MFL system, using the reflection coupling (see [10, 11]). In the
case of one-player game (in other word, optimization), once the potential function is convex, we use an
argument, similar to that in [15,16], based on the Lasalle’s invariant principle to prove the (non-exponential)
ergodicity of the MFL system under mild conditions on the coefficients.
In view of applications, our result can be used to justify the applicability of the gradient descent algorithm
for training (deep) neural networks. As mentioned in [15–17, 22, 23], the supervised learning with (deep)
neural networks can be viewed as a minimization problem (or optimal control problem in the context of
deep learning) on the space of probability measures, and the gradient descent algorithm is approximately
a discretization of the corresponding mean-field Langevin dynamics. The present paper provides a more
general framework for such studies. In particular, it is remarkable that in section 4 we provide a theoretically
convergent numerical scheme for the generative adversarial networks (GAN) as well as a way to characterize
the training error.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the definitions of a game on a
random environment and the corresponding MFL system. In section 3 the main theorems of the paper are
stated without proofs. In section 4 we present the applications to the dynamic games and the GAN. Finally
in section 5 we present the proofs of the main theorems.
2. Notation and definitions.
2.1. Preliminary. Denote by Y the space of environment, and assume Y to be Polish. Throughout
the paper, we fix a probability measure m on Y. Define the product space R¯d := Rd × Y for d ∈ N. In this
paper we consider a game in which the players choose strategies among Π := {p¯i ∈ Pp(R¯d) : p¯i(Rd, ·) = m},
where Pp(R¯d) is the space of probability measures on R¯d with finite p-moments for some p ≥ 1. We say that
a function F : Π→ R is in C1 if there exists a function δFδν : Π× R¯d → R such that for all ν, ν′ ∈ Π
(2.1) F (ν′)− F (ν) =
∫ 1
0
∫
R¯d
δF
δν
(
(1− λ)ν + λν′, x¯)(ν′ − ν)(dx¯)dλ.
We will refer to δFδν as the linear functional derivative. There is at most one
δF
δν , modulo a constant, satisfying
(2.1).
Here is the basic assumption we apply throughout the paper.
Assumption 2.1 (basic assumption). Assume that for some p ≥ 1, the function F : Π→ R belongs to
C1 and
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• F is Wp-continuous, where Wp stands for the p-Wasserstein distance;
• δFδp¯i : (p¯i, x, y) ∈ Π×Rd ×Y 7→ δFδp¯i (p¯i, x, y) ∈ R is Wp-continuous in p¯i and continuously differentiable
in x;
• δFδp¯i is of p-polynomial growth in x¯ = (x, y), that is, supp¯i∈Π
∣∣ δF
δp¯i (p¯i, x¯)
∣∣ ≤ C(1 + |x¯|p).
Remark 2.2. Since in our setting the law on the environment Y is fixed, by disintegration we may identify
a distribution p¯i ∈ Π with the probability measures (pi(·|y))
y∈Y ⊂ Pp(Rd) such that p¯i(dx¯) = pi(dx|y)m(dy).
2.2. Game on random environment. In this paper, we consider a particular game in which the
strategies of the n players are correlated through the random environment (or signal) Y. Let ni ∈ N for
i = 1, · · · , n and N := ∑ni=1 ni. As mentioned before, the i-th player chooses his strategy (a probability
measure) among Πi := {ν ∈ Pp(R¯ni) : ν(Rni , ·) = m}, while the joint distribution of the other players’
strategies belongs to the space Π−i := {ν ∈ Pp(R¯N−ni) : ν(RN−ni , ·) = m}. The i-th player aims at
optimizing his objective function F i : Πi ×Π−i → R. More precisely, he faces the optimization:
given µ ∈ Π−i, solve inf
ν∈Πi
F i(ν, µ).
In this paper, we are more interested in solving a regularized version of the game above. We use the relative
entropy with respect to Lebn
i ×m, denoted by Hi, as the regularizer. Namely, given µ ∈ Π−i the i-th player
solves:
inf
ν∈Πi
V i(ν, µ), V i(ν, µ) := F i(ν, µ) +
σ2
2
Hi(ν) for some σ > 0.
For p¯i ∈ Π, we denote by p¯ii ∈ Πi its marginal distribution on R¯ni , and by p¯i−i ∈ Π−i the marginal distribution
on R¯N−ni .
Definition 2.3. A probability measure p¯i ∈ Π is a Nash equilibrium of this game, if
p¯ii ∈ arg min
ν∈Πi
V i(ν, p¯i−i), for all i = 1, · · · , n.
Example 2.4. To have a concrete example of games on random environment, we refer to the dynamic
games, both discrete-time and continuous-time models. In the discrete-time case, let Y := {1, · · · , T} for
some T ∈ N and m be the uniform distribution on Y. Define the controlled dynamics:
Θiy = ϕ
i
y(Θ
i
y−1, pi
i(·|y), p¯i−i), where p¯ii(·, y) = pii(·|y)m(y), for y ∈ Y.
If the n players minimize the objective functions of the form f i
(
(Θiy)y∈Y
)
by choosing the strategy p¯ii, then
the game fits the framework of this paper.
Similarly for the continuous-time model, consider the space Y := [0, T ] for T ∈ R and let m be the
uniform distribution on the interval. Define the continuous-time dynamics:
dΘiy = ϕ
i
(
pii(·|y), p¯i−i,Θiy, y
)
dy, where p¯ii(·, dy) = pii(·|y)m(dy), for y ∈ Y.
If the n players minimize the objective functions of the form f i
(
(Θiy)y∈Y
)
by choosing the strategy p¯ii, then
this game also fits in the framework discussed above.
2.3. Mean-field Langevin system. For any fixed µ ∈ Π−i, we assume that F i(·, µ) : ν ∈ Πi 7→
F i(ν, µ) ∈ R satisfies Assumption 2.1. The linear derivative is denoted by δF iδν (·, µ, ·) : (ν, x¯i) 7→ δF
i
δν (ν, µ, x¯
i),
with x¯i = (xi, y) ∈ R¯ni . In order to compute Nash equilibria of the game on random environment, we are
interested in the following mean-field Langevin (MFL) dynamics:
(2.2) dXit = −∇xi
δF i
δν
(p¯iit, p¯i
−i
t , X
i
t , Y )dt+ σdW
i
t , for i = 1, · · · , n,
where W = (W i)i is an N -dimension Brownian motion, Y is a random variable taking values in Y and
satisfying the law m, and p¯it := LawX¯t with X¯t := (X
1
t , · · · , Xnt , Y ). In this paper we will discuss the
relation between the MFL dynamics and the Nash equilibrium of the game on the random environment.
4 G. CONFORTI, A. KAZEYKINA, AND Z. REN
Remark 2.5. Here are some important observations:
• The random variable Y plays the role of parameter in the MFL system. This leads us to study the
system:
(2.3) dXyt = −
(
∇xi δF
i
δν
(p¯iit, p¯i
−i
t , X
y,i
t , y)
)
i=1,··· ,n
dt+ σdWt, for m-a.s. y ∈ Y.
Formally, the marginal laws of the MFL system above with a fixed y ∈ Y satisfy the following system
of Fokker-Planck equations:
(2.4) ∂tpi
i(·|y) = ∇xi ·
(
∇xi δF
i
δν
(p¯ii, p¯i−i, ·, y)pii(·|y) + σ
2
2
∇xipii(·|y)
)
,
for all i = 1, · · · , n, m-a.s. y ∈ Y.
• For fixed y ∈ Y, the dynamic systems for (Xi(y))
i
are only weakly coupled through the marginal
distributions.
• Although we name the system after Langevin, the drift term of the dynamics of the aggregated
vector (Xi)i=1,··· ,n is in general not in the form of the gradient of a potential function.
3. Main results.
3.1. Optimization with marginal constraint. One of our observations is the following first order
condition of the optimization over the probability measures with marginal constraint.
Theorem 3.1 (first order condition). Let F : Π → R satisfy Assumption 2.1. Define V (p¯i) := F (p¯i) +
ηH(p¯i) for some η > 0. If p¯i∗ ∈ argminp¯i∈Π V (p¯i), then
(3.1) ∇x δF
δp¯i
(p¯i∗, ·, y) + η∇x ln
(
pi∗(·|y)) = 0 for m-a.s. y.
Conversely, if we additionally assume that F is convex, then p¯i∗ ∈ Π satisfying (3.1) implies p¯i∗ ∈ argminp¯i∈Π V (p¯i).
Remark 3.2. We remark that
• the regularizer H(p¯i) plays an important role for the proof of the necessary condition. Without it,
for p¯i∗ ∈ argminp¯i∈Π V (p¯i) we can only conclude that there is a measurable function f : Y→ R such
that
δF
δp¯i
(p¯i∗, x, y) = f(y), p¯i∗-a.s.;
• for the readers more interested in the minimization of the unregularized potential function F , by
standard argument (see e.g. [16, Proposition 2.3]) one may prove that under mild conditions the
minimum of F + ηH converges to the minimum of F as η → 0.
3.2. Equilibria of games on random environment. Applying the first order condition above to
the context of the game on random environment, we immediately obtain the following necessary condition
for the Nash equilibria.
Corollary 3.3 (Necessary condition for Nash equilibria). For i = 1, · · · , n and µ ∈ Π−i, let F i(·, µ) :
ν ∈ Πi 7→ F i(ν, µ) ∈ R satisfy Assumption 2.1. If p¯i ∈ Π is a Nash equilibrium, we have for i = 1, · · · , n,
(3.2) ∇xi δF
i
δν
(p¯ii, p¯i−i, xi, y) +
σ2
2
∇xi ln
(
pii(xi|y)) = 0 for all xi ∈ Rni and m-a.s. y ∈ Y.
We shall use the first order equation (3.2) to show the following sufficient condition for the uniqueness
of Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 3.4 (Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium: Monotonicity). The functions (F i)i=1,··· ,n satisfy
the monotonicity condition, if for p¯i, p¯i′ ∈ Π we have
n∑
i=1
∫ (
δF i
δν
(p¯ii, p¯i−i, x¯i)− δF
i
δν
(p¯i′i, p¯i′−i, x¯i)
)
(p¯i − p¯i′)(dx¯) ≥ 0.
We have the following results:
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(i) for n = 1, if a function F satisfies the monotonicity condition then it is convex on Π. Conversely,
if F is convex and satisfies Assumption 2.1, then F satisfies the monotonicity condition.
(ii) in general (n ≥ 1), for i = 1, · · · , n and any µ ∈ Π−i, let F i(·, µ) : ν ∈ Πi 7→ F i(ν, µ) ∈ R
satisfy Assumption 2.1 and (F i)i=1,··· ,n satisfy the monotonicity condition. Then for any two Nash
equilibria p¯i∗, p¯i′∗ ∈ Π we have (p¯i∗)i = (p¯i′∗)i for all i = 1, · · · , n.
Remark 3.5. Similar monotonicity conditions are common assumptions to ensure the uniqueness of equi-
librium in the game theory, in particular in the literature of mean-field games, see e.g. [19].
As for the existence of Nash equilibria, we obtain the following result following the classical argument
based on the fixed point theorem.
Theorem 3.6 (Existence of equilibria). Assume that for i = 1, · · · , n, and µ ∈ Π−i
(i) the set argminν∈Πi V
i(ν, µ) is non-empty and convex;
(ii) the function F˜ i(p¯i) := F i(p¯ii, p¯i−i) is Wp-continuous on Π;
(iii) the function F i(·, µ) : ν ∈ Πi 7→ F i(ν, µ) ∈ R satisfies Assumption 2.1, and there exist some
q ≥ q′ > 0, C, C ′ > 0 ∈ R such that for all p¯i ∈ Π we have
C ′|x¯i|q′ − C ≤ δF
i
δν
(p¯ii, p¯i−i, x¯i) ≤ C|x¯i|q + C.(3.3)
Then there exists at least one Nash equilibrium p¯i∗ ∈ Π for the game on random environment.
Remark 3.7. There are various sufficient conditions so that the set argminν∈Πi V
i(ν, µ) is convex, for
example, the function ν 7→ V i(ν, µ) is quasi-convex, or V i(ν, µ) has a unique minimizer. That is why we
leave the assumption (i) in the abstract form.
3.3. Invariant measure of the MFL system. In view of the Fokker-Planck equation (2.4), the first
order equation (3.2) appears to be a sufficient condition for p¯i being an invariant measure of the MFL system
(2.2). That is why we consider the MFL dynamics as a reasonable tool to compute the Nash equilibria of
the game on random environment.
The following Theorem 3.8 suggests that proving the existence of Nash equilibria and the uniqueness
of the invariant measure, we can establish the equivalence between the invariant measure of (2.2) and one
Nash equilibrium. While the existence of Nash equilibria has been discussed inTheorem 3.6, the uniqueness
of invariant measure of mean-field dynamics is more complicated and is indeed a long-standing problem in
probability and analysis. We are going to use the coupling argument in order to obtain the contraction result
in Theorem 3.10.
Define the average Wasserstein distance:
Wp(p¯i, p¯i′) :=
(∫
Y
Wpp
(
pi(·|y), pi′(·|y))m(dy)) 1p ,
and the spaces of flow of probability measures:
Cp([0, T ],Π) :=
{
(p¯it)t∈[0,T ] : for each t, p¯it ∈ Π, and t 7→ p¯it is continuous in Wp
}
,
Cp([0, T ],Π) :=
{
(p¯it)t∈[0,T ] : for each t, p¯it ∈ Π, and t 7→ p¯it is continuous in Wp
}
.
Theorem 3.8. For i = 1, · · · , n and µ ∈ Π−i, let F i(·, µ) : ν ∈ Πi 7→ F i(ν, µ) ∈ R satisfy Assump-
tion 2.1. Further assume that
• the initial distribution p¯i0 = Law(X¯0) ∈ Π;
• for each i = 1, · · · , n, the function ∇xi δF
i
δν is Lipschitz continuous in the following sense∣∣∣∣∇xi δF iδν (ν, µ, xi, y)−∇xi δF iδν (ν′, µ′, x′i, y)
∣∣∣∣
≤ C (Wp(ν, ν′) +Wp(µ, µ′) + |xi − x′i|)+ C0Wp(µ(·|y), µ′(·|y)),
and satisfies
(3.4) sup
ν∈Πi,µ∈Π−i,y∈Y
∣∣∣∣∇xi δF iδν (ν, µ, 0, y)
∣∣∣∣ <∞.
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Then the MFL system (2.2) admits a unique strong solution in Cp([0, T ],Π) for all T > 0. In particular,
if C0 = 0 then the unique solution lies in Cp([0, T ],Π) for all T > 0. Moreover, each Nash equilibrium p¯i
∗
defined in Definition 2.3 is an invariant measure of (2.2).
Remark 3.9. (i) The dependence on µ(·|y) of the function ∇xi δF
i
δν (ν, µ, x
i, y) is inevitable for some
interesting examples such as (1.2) in the introduction, where under some mild conditions we may compute
∇xi δF
i
δν
(
νi, (νj)j 6=i, xi, y
)
:=
∫
∇xif i(x1, · · · , xi, · · · , xn, y)
∏
j 6=i
νj(dxj |y).
Note that when there is only one player, there is no such dependence.
(ii) The Lipschitz condition with respect toWp(ν, ν′) andWp(µ, µ′) can be replaced by the one with respect
to Wp(ν, ν′) and Wp(µ, µ′). The latter is weaker. Under such assumption we cannot prove the particular
case that the unique solution lies in Cp([0, T ],Π) for all T > 0 when C0 = 0. In the following analysis of the
one-player problem it is crucial for us that the solution is in Cp([0, T ],Π), so we prefer to state the Lipschitz
condition in its current form.
Theorem 3.10 (Uniqueness of invariant measure: Contraction). For i = 1, · · · , n and µ ∈ Π−i, let
F i(·, µ) : ν ∈ Πi 7→ F i(ν, µ) ∈ R satisfy Assumption 2.1. Assume that
• for each i = 1, · · · , n, the function ∇xi δF
i
δν is Lipschitz continuous in the following sense:∣∣∣∣∣
(
∇xi δF
i
δν
(p¯ii, p¯i−i, xi, y)
)
i=1,··· ,n
−
(
∇xi δF
i
δν
(p¯i′i, p¯i′−i, x′i, y)
)
i=1,··· ,n
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ γ
(
W1(p¯i, p¯i′) +W1
(
pi(·|y), pi′(·|y)))+ C|xi − x′i|,
and (3.4) holds true;
• there is a continuous function κ : (0,+∞)→ R s.t. lim sup
r→+∞
κ(r) < 0,
∫ 1
0
rκ(r)dr < +∞ and for any
(p¯i, y) ∈ Π× Y we have for all x, x′ ∈ RN (x 6= x′)
n∑
i=1
(xi − x′i) ·
(
−∇xi δF
i
δν
(p¯ii, p¯i−i, xi, y) +∇xi δF
i
δν
(p¯ii, p¯i−i, x′i, y)
)
≤ κ (|x− x′|) |x− x′|2 .
Let p¯i0, p¯i
′
0 ∈ Pq(R¯d) ∩Π for some q > 1 be two initial distributions of the MFL system (2.2). Then we have
(3.5) W1(p¯it, p¯i′t) ≤ e(2γ−cσ
2)t 2
ϕ(R1)
W1(p¯i0, p¯i′0),
where the coefficients read
ϕ(r) = exp
(
−1
2
∫ r
0
uκ+(u)
σ2
du
)
, c−1 =
∫ R2
0
Φ(r)ϕ(r)−1dr, Φ(r) =
∫ r
0
ϕ(s)ds,
R1 := inf{R ≥ 0 : κ(r) ≤ 0 for all r ≥ R},
R2 := inf{R ≥ R1 : κ(r)R(R−R1) ≤ −4σ2 for all r ≥ R}.
In particular, if 2γ < cσ2 (i.e. the MFL system has small dependence on the marginal laws), there is a
unique invariant measure in ∪q>1Pq(R¯N ) ∩Π.
3.4. Special case: one player. When the problem degenerates to the case of a single player, the MFL
dynamics becomes a gradient flow and the function V = F + σ
2
2 H is a natural Lyapunov function for the
dynamics.
Theorem 3.11 (Gradient flow). Consider a function F satisfying Assumption 2.1 with p = 2. Let the
assumption of Theorem 3.8 hold true, and further assume that
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• there is ε > 0 such that for all p¯i ∈ Π and y ∈ Y
(3.6) x · ∇x δF
δν
(p¯i, x, y) ≥ ε|x|2, for |x| big enough;
• for all p¯i ∈ Π and y ∈ Y, the mapping x 7→ ∇x δFδν (p¯i, x, y) belongs to C3;
• for all y ∈ Y, the function (p¯i, x) 7→ ∇x δFδν (p¯i, x, y),∇2x δFδν (p¯i, x, y) are jointly continuous.
Then we have for s′ > s > 0
(3.7) V (p¯is′)− V (p¯is) = −
∫ s′
s
∫
R¯N
∣∣∣∣∇x δFδν (p¯it, x, y) + σ22 ∇x ln (pit(x|y))
∣∣∣∣2 p¯it(dx¯)dt
Using an argument, similar to that in [15, 16], based on the Lasalle’s invariant principle, we can show
the following theorem.
Theorem 3.12. Consider the following statements:
(i) p¯i0 ∈ ∪q>2Pq(R¯N );
(ii.a) Y is countable;
(ii.b) Y = Rm, m is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and the function e−
2
σ2
δF
δν (p¯i,·)m
is semiconvex in x¯ for any given p¯i ∈ Π.
Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.11 hold true. Further assume (i), (ii.a) or (i), (ii.b). Then all the W2-
cluster points of the marginal laws (p¯it)t≥0 of the MFL system (2.2) belong to the set
(3.8) I :=
{
p¯i ∈ Π : ∇x δF
δν
(p¯i, ·, y) + σ
2
2
∇x ln
(
pi(·|y)) = 0 m-a.s.} .
Remark 3.13 (The limit set and the mean-field equilibria on the environment). Consider the case where
the probability measure on the environment m is atomless. In particular, for a fixed y ∈ Y the probability
p¯i ∈ Π does not depend on pi(·|y). Therefore the equation in (3.8) is a sufficient and necessary condition for
(3.9) pi(·|y) = argmin
ν
(∫
δF
δν
(p¯i, x, y)ν(dx) +
σ2
2
H(ν|Leb)
)
, for m-a.s. y,
where H(·|Leb) is the relative entropy with respect to the Lebesgue measure. If we view the variable y as
the index of the ‘players’, (3.9) indicates that all p¯i ∈ I are (mean-field) Nash equilibria of the game where
the y-player aims at:
inf
ν
(∫
δF
δν
(p¯i, x, y)ν(dx) +
σ2
2
H(ν|Leb)
)
.
Corollary 3.14. If the function V is convex, the limit set I is a singleton and thus the marginal laws
(p¯it)t≥0 converge in W2 to the minimizer of V .
4. Applications.
4.1. Dynamic games and deep neural networks. As mentioned in Example 2.4, both discrete-time
and continuous-time dynamic games can be viewed as games on the random environment.
Take the continuous-time dynamic game as an example, in particular Y = [0, T ]. Consider the controlled
process of the i-th player
(4.1) dΘiy =
∫
ϕi
(
xi, p¯i−i,Θiy, y
)
pii(dxi|y)dy.
and his objective function
F i(p¯ii, p¯i−i) :=
∫ T
0
ci
(
xi, p¯i−i,Θiy, y
)
pii(dxi|y)dy + gi(ΘiT ).
Define the Hamiltonian function Hi(xi, µ, θi, y, p) := ci(xi, µ, θi, y) + p · ϕi(xi, µ, θi, y). Assume that
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• the coefficients ϕi, ci are uniformly Lipschitz in (xi, θi);
• ϕi, ci, gi are continuously differentiable in θi;
• ∇θiϕi,∇θici are uniformly Lipschitz in (xi, θi), and ∇θigi is uniformly Lipschitz in xi.
It follows from a standard variational calculus that
δF i
δν
(ν, µ, xi, y) = Hi(xi, µ,Θiy, y, P
i
y ),
where Θi follows the dynamics (4.1) and P i is the solution to the linear ODE:
P iy = ∇θg(ΘiT ) +
∫ T
y
∇θHi(xi, µ,Θiy, y, P iy )pii(dxi|y)dy.
Therefore, according to Theorem 3.10, the Nash equilibrium of this dynamic game can be approximated by
the marginal law of the MFL system.
In case the number of players n = 1, the marginal laws of the MFL system approximates the minimizer
of the optimization. There is a rising interest in modeling the forward propagation of the deep neural
networks using a controlled dynamics and in connecting the deep learning to the optimal control problems,
see e.g. [5, 6, 9, 17, 20, 21]. For the controlled processes in the particular form (4.1), we refer to Section 4
in [15] for the connection between the optimal control problem and the deep neural networks. In particular,
we remark that the backward propagation algorithm is simply a discretization of the corresponding MFL
dynamics.
4.2. Linear-convex zero-sum game and GAN. Consider the zero-sum game between two players,
i.e. F 1 = −F 2(=: F ). For F satisfying the assumption in Theorem 3.10 so that the contraction result (3.5)
holds true, we may use the following MFL system to approximate the unique Nash equilibrium:{
dX1t = −∇x1 δFδν (p¯i1t , p¯i2t , X1t , Y )dt+ σdW 1t ,
dX2t = ∇x2 δFδν (p¯i2t , p¯i1t , X2t , Y )dt+ σdW 2t .
(4.2)
Now we consider a particular subclass of the zero-sum games. Assume that F : (ν, µ) ∈ Π1 × Π2 7→
F (ν, µ) ∈ R is linear in µ and convex in ν, and define V˜ (ν, µ) := F (ν, µ) + σ22
(
H(ν)−H(µ)). In particular,
• δFδµ does not depend on µ;
• the function Φ : ν 7→ maxµ∈Π2 V˜ (ν, µ)− σ
2
2 H(ν) is convex.
If the Nash equilibrium exists, denoted by p¯i∗, by the standard argument we have
min
ν∈Π1
max
µ∈Π2
V˜ (ν, µ) = V˜ (p¯i∗,1, p¯i∗,2) = max
µ∈Π2
min
ν∈Π1
V˜ (ν, µ).
It follows from Theorem 3.1 that µ∗[ν] := argmaxµ∈Π2 V˜ (ν, µ) has the explicit density
µ∗[ν](x2, dy)
m(dy)
= C(ν, y)e−
2
σ2
δF
δµ (ν,x
2,y),
where C(ν, y) is the normalization constant. Further, assume that the function Φ(ν) = V˜ (ν, µ∗[ν]) satisfies
the assumption of Theorem 3.12 and recall that Φ is convex, it follows from Corollary 3.14 that we may
approximate the minimizer p¯i∗,1 using the dynamics:
(4.3) dXt = −∇x δΦ
δν
(p¯it, Xt, Y )dt+ σdWt.
Compared to the dynamics (4.2), the dynamics (4.3) enjoys the natural Lyapunov function V˜ , i.e. t 7→ V˜ (p¯it)
decreases monotonically.
As an application, the generative adversarial networks (GAN) can be viewed as a linear-convex game.
Given a bounded, continuous, non-constant activation function ϕ, consider the parametrized functions
(4.4) {z 7→ E[ϕ(X, z)] : Law(X) = ν ∈ P2(Rn2)}
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as the options of the discriminators. The regularized GAN aims at computing the Nash equilibrium of the
game:
Define V˜ (ν, µ) := −
∫
E[ϕ(X, z)](µ− µˆ)(dz)− 1
2
λ
(∫
|z|2µ(dz)− E[|X|2]
)
− σ
2
2
(
H(µ)−H(ν)){
Generator : supµ∈P2(Rn1 ) V˜ (ν, µ)
Discriminator : infν∈P2(Rn2 ) V˜ (ν, µ)
,
where µˆ ∈ P2(Rn1) is the distribution of interest. Indeed, in order to compute the Nash equilibrium of the
game, it is appealing to sample the MFL dynamics (4.2) and approximate its invariant measure. However,
in order that the contraction result in Theorem 3.10 holds true, it is crucial that the MFL system has small
dependence on the marginal laws, which is not necessarily true in the context of GAN. Here we present
another approach, which exploits the particular structure of the linear-convex game. As discussed before,
the optimizer of the generator given ν ∈ P2(Rn2) is explicit and has the density:
(4.5) µ∗[ν](z) = C(ν)e−
2
σ2
(
E[ϕ(X,z)]+λ2 |z|2
)
.
Further for the potential function Φ(ν) := V˜ (ν, µ∗[ν])− σ22 H(ν) we have
(4.6)
δΦ
δν
(ν, x) = −
∫
ϕ(x, z)(µ∗[ν]− µˆ)(dz) + λ
2
|x|2.
Then the strategy of the discriminator in the Nash equilibrium can be approximated by the MFL dynamics
(4.3). In the perspective of numerical realization, note that the law µ∗[ν] can be simulated by the MCMC
algorithms such as Metropolis-Hastings.
In order to illustrate the advantage of the algorithm using the MFL dynamics (4.3), here we present the
numerical result for a toy example. We are going to use the GAN to generate the samples of the exponential
distribution with intensity 1. In this test, the optimal response of the generator, µ∗[ν], is computed via
Metropolis algorithm with Gaussian proposal distribution with zero mean and variance optimised according
to [13]. The discriminator chooses parametrized functions among (4.4), where
ϕ(X, z) = C(Az + b)+, with X = (C,A, b).
When we numerically run the MFL dynamics (4.3) to train the discriminator, we use a 3000-particle system,
that is, the network is composed of 3000 neurones, and set its initial distribution to be standard Gaussian.
The other parameters are chosen as follows: σ = 0.4, dt = 0.01, λ = 0.2. Figure 1 shows the training result
after 60 iterations. In particular, we see that the training error decreases monotonically as suggested by our
theoretical results.
5. Proofs.
5.1. Optimization with marginal constraint.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Necessary condition Step 1. Let p¯i∗ ∈ Π be a minimizer of V . Since H(p¯i∗) <
∞, the probability measure p¯i∗ is absolutely continuous wrt Leb×m. Take any probability measure p¯i ∈ Π such
that H(p¯i) <∞, in particular p¯i is also absolutely continuous wrt Leb×m. Denote the convex combination
by p¯iε := εp¯i + (1− ε)p¯i∗ ∈ Π. Define the function h(z) := z ln z for z ∈ R+ and h(0) = 0. Then
0 ≤ V (p¯i
)− V (p¯i∗)

=
F (p¯i)− F (p¯i∗)

+ η
∫
h(pi(x|y))− h(pi∗(x|y))
ε
dxm(dy)
=
1

∫ 
0
∫
δF
δp¯i
(p¯iλ, x¯)(p¯i − p¯i∗)(dx¯)dλ+ η
∫
h(pi(x|y))− h(pi∗(x|y))
ε
dxm(dy).
Since supλ∈[0,ε] | δFδp¯i (p¯iλ, x¯)| ≤ C(1 + |x¯|p) and p¯i, p¯i∗ ∈ Π, by the dominated convergence theorem
lim
ε→0
1

∫ 
0
∫
δF
δp¯i
(p¯iλ, x¯)(p¯i − p¯i∗)(dx¯)dλ =
∫
δF
δp¯i
(p¯i∗, x¯)(p¯i − p¯i∗)(dx¯).
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(a) Histogram of GAN’s sampling and the target density (b) Training error
Figure 1: Learning via MCMC-GAN: histogram of learned distribution and training error.
Since the function h is convex, we have h(pi
(x|y))−h(pi∗(x|y))
ε ≤ h(pi(x|y))−h(pi∗(x|y)). Note that
∫ (
h(pi(x|y))−
h(pi∗(x|y)))dxm(y) = H(p¯i)−H(p¯i∗) <∞. By Fatou lemma, we obtain
lim sup
ε→0
∫
h(pi(x|y))− h(pi∗(x|y))
ε
dxm(dy) ≤
∫
lim
ε→0
h(pi(x|y))− h(pi∗(x|y))
ε
dxm(dy)
=
∫
lnpi∗(x|y)(p¯i − p¯i∗)(dx¯).
Therefore we have
(5.1) 0 ≤ lim sup
ε→0
V (p¯i)− V (p¯i∗)

≤
∫ (
δF
δp¯i
(p¯i∗, x¯) + η lnpi∗(x|y)
)
(p¯i − p¯i∗)(dx¯).
Step 2. We are going to show that for m-a.s. y
Ξy(x) :=
δF
δp¯i
(p¯i∗, x¯) + η lnpi∗(x|y) is equal to a constant pi∗(·|y)-a.s.(5.2)
Define the mean value c(y) :=
∫
Rd Ξy(x)pi
∗(dx|y) and let ε, ε′ > 0. Consider the probability measure p¯i ∈ Π
absolutely continuous wrt p¯i∗ such that
dpi(·|y)
dpi∗(·|y) =
1, for y such that pi
∗(Ξy ≤ c(y)− ε∣∣y) < ε′
1Ξy≤c(y)−ε
pi∗
(
Ξy≤c(y)−ε
∣∣y) , otherwise .
Since dp¯idp¯i∗ is bounded, we have that p¯i ∈ Π and H(p¯i) < ∞. In particular (5.1) holds true for this p¯i. Also
note that Ξy ≤ c(y)− ε, pi(·|y)-a.s. for y such that pi∗
(
Ξy ≤ c(y)− ε
∣∣y) ≥ ε′. So we have
0 ≤
∫
Y
∫
Rd
Ξy(x)
(
pi(dx|y)− pi∗(dx|y))m(dy)
=
∫
pi∗
(
Ξy≤c(y)−ε
∣∣y)≥ε′
∫
Rd
Ξy(x)
(
pi(dx|y)− pi∗(dx|y))m(dy)
=
∫
pi∗
(
Ξy≤c(y)−ε
∣∣y)≥ε′
(∫
Rd
Ξy(x)pi(dx|y)− c(y)
)
m(dy)
≤ −ε m{y : pi∗(Ξy ≤ c(y)− ε∣∣y) ≥ ε′} .
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Therefore we conclude that pi∗
(
Ξy ≤ c(y) − ε
∣∣y) < ε′ for m-a.s. y. Since this is true for arbitrary ε′, ε > 0,
we obtain (5.2).
Step 3. We are going to show that p¯i∗ is equivalent to Leb×m, so that Ξy does not depend on x, Leb×m-a.s.
and the first order equation (3.1) holds true. Suppose the opposite, i.e. there is a set K ∈ R¯d such that
p¯i∗(K) = 0 and Leb×m(K) > 0. In particular, lnpi∗(x|y) = −∞ on K. Denote Ky := {x ∈ Rd : (x, y) ∈ K}.
We may assume that there exist K > ε > 0 such that Leb(Ky) ∈ [ε,K] for all y ∈ Y. Define a probability
measure p¯i ∈ Π such that for all Borel-measurable A ⊂ Rd
pi(A|y) := 1
2
pi∗(A|y) + 1
2Leb(Ky)
∫
A∩Ky
dx.
It is easy to verify that H(p¯i) <∞, so (5.1) holds true and it implies
0 ≤ 1
2
∫
K
(
δF
δp¯i
(p¯i∗, x¯) + η lnpi∗(x|y)
)
p¯i(dx¯)− 1
2
∫ (
δF
δp¯i
(p¯i∗, x¯) + η lnpi∗(x|y)
)
p¯i∗(dx¯)
≤ −∞+
∫
C(1 + |x¯|p)p¯i∗(dx¯)− η
2
H(p¯i∗) = −∞.
It is a contradiction, so p¯i∗ is equivalent to Leb×m.
Sufficient condition Assume that F is convex. Let p¯i∗ ∈ Π satisfy the first order equation (3.1), in particular,
p¯i∗ is equivalent to Leb × m. Take any p¯i ∈ Π absolutely continuous wrt Leb × m (otherwise V (p¯i) = +∞),
and thus absolutely continuous wrt the measure p¯i∗. Define p¯i := (1− )p¯i∗ + p¯i for  > 0. By the convexity
of F we obtain
F (p¯i)− F (p¯i∗) ≥ lim
ε→0
1
ε
(
F (p¯iε)− F (p¯i∗))
= lim
ε→0
1
ε
∫ ε
0
∫
R¯d
δF
δp¯i
(p¯iλ, x¯)(p¯i − p¯i∗)(dx¯)dλ =
∫
R¯d
δF
δp¯i
(p¯i∗, x¯)(p¯i − p¯i∗)(dx¯).
The last equality is due to the dominated convergence theorem. On the other hand, by convexity of the
function h,
H(p¯i)−H(p¯i∗) ≥
∫
R¯d
lnpi∗(x|y)(p¯i − p¯i∗)(dx¯).
Hence
V (p¯i)− V (p¯i∗) ≥
∫
R¯d
(
δF
δp¯i
(p¯i∗, ·) + η lnpi∗(x|y)
)
(p¯i − p¯i∗)(dx¯) = 0,
so p¯i∗ is a minimizer.
5.2. Equilibria of game.
Proof of Corollary 3.4. (i) Let n = 1. Take three probability measures p¯i, p¯i′, p¯i′′ ∈ Π such that
p¯i = 12 (p¯i
′ + p¯i′′). Denote p¯i′λ := λp¯i + (1 − λ)p¯i′ and p¯i′′λ := λp¯i + (1 − λ)p¯i′′. By the definition of the linear
derivative of F we obtain
F (p¯i′)− 2F (p¯i) + F (p¯i′′) =
∫ 1
0
∫
R¯N
δF
δν
(p¯i′λ, x¯)(p¯i′ − p¯i)(dx¯)dλ+
∫ 1
0
∫
R¯N
δF
δν
(p¯i′′λ, x¯)(p¯i′′ − p¯i)(dx¯)dλ.
Note that p¯i′ − p¯i = p¯i − p¯i′′ = 12−2λ
(
p¯i′λ − p¯i′′λ). Therefore we have
F (p¯i′)− 2F (p¯i) + F (p¯i′′) =
∫ 1
0
1
2− 2λ
∫
R¯N
(
δF
δν
(p¯i′λ, x¯)− δF
δν
(p¯i′′λ, x¯)
)
(p¯i′λ − p¯i′′λ)(dx¯)dλ ≥ 0.
Finally note that λ 7→ (F (p¯i′λ), F (p¯i′′λ)) is continuous. So F satisfying the monotonicity condition must be
convex on Π.
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On the other hand, suppose F is convex on Π. Following a similar computation, we obtain
0 ≤ 1
ε
(
F (p¯i′)− F (p¯i′ε)− F (p¯i′′ε) + F (p¯i′′)
)
=
1
ε
∫ ε
0
1
2
∫
R¯N
(
δF
δν
(p¯i′λ, x¯)− δF
δν
(p¯i′′λ, x¯)
)
(p¯i′ − p¯i′′)(dx¯)dλ.
Let p¯i′, p¯i′′ ∈ Π. It follows from the dominated convergence theorem that
0 ≤ lim
ε→0
1
ε
∫ ε
0
1
2
∫
R¯N
(
δF
δν
(p¯i′λ, x¯)− δF
δν
(p¯i′′λ, x¯)
)
(p¯i′ − p¯i′′)(dx¯)dλ
=
1
2
∫
R¯N
(
δF
δν
(p¯i′, x¯)− δF
δν
(p¯i′′, x¯)
)
(p¯i′ − p¯i′′)(dx¯).
So F satisfies the monotonicity condition on Π.
(ii) Let p¯i∗ ∈ Π be a Nash equilibrium of the game. Then, by Corollary 3.3 we have that for every i there
exists a function f i : Y→ R
δF i
δν
((p¯i∗)i, (p¯i∗)−i, xi, y) +
σ2
2
ln((pi∗)i(xi|y)) = f i(y), for m-a.s. y.
Let p¯i∗, p¯i′∗ ∈ Π be Nash equilibriums. Then monotonicity condition Corollary 3.4 implies
n∑
i=1
∫
R¯N
(
−σ
2
2
ln((pi∗)i(xi|y)) + σ
2
2
ln((pi′∗)i(xi|y))
)
(p¯i∗ − p¯i′∗)(dx¯) ≥ 0,
because the marginal distributions of p¯i∗ and p¯i′∗ on Y coincide. The latter inequality can be rewritten
0 ≤ −
n∑
i=1
∫
R¯ni
ln
(
(pi∗)i(xi|y)
(pi′∗)i(xi|y)
)
((p¯i∗)i − (p¯i′∗)i)(dx¯i)
= −
n∑
i=1
(
H((p¯i∗)i|(p¯i′∗)i) +H((p¯i′∗)i|(p¯i∗)i)) .
This is only possible if (p¯i∗)i = (p¯i′∗)i for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. For p¯i ∈ Π denote Ri(p¯i) := argminν∈Πi V i(ν, p¯i−i) for i = 1, · · · , n, and define
R(p¯i) := {p¯i′ ∈ Π : p¯i′i ∈ Ri(p¯i) for i = 1, · · · , n}.
Step 1. First we prove thatR(p¯i) isWp-compact. For any νi ∈ Ri(p¯i), it follows from the first order equation
(3.1) that
νi(x¯i) = C(νi, p¯i−i)e−
2
σ2
δFi
δν (ν
i,p¯i−i,x¯i),
where C(νi, p¯i−i) > 0 is the normalization constant so that νi is a probability measure. Take a p′ > p. The
condition (3.3) implies that C(νi, p¯i−i) is uniformly bounded as well as∫
R¯ni
|x¯i|p′νi(dx¯i) ≤ C(νi, p¯i−i)
∫
R¯ni
|x¯i|p′e−C′|x¯i|q+Cdxim(dy).
So we have
C
i
:= sup
νi∈Ri(p¯i)
∫
R¯ni
|x¯i|p′νi(dx¯i) <∞.
Therefore, R(p¯i) ⊂ E := {ν ∈ Π : νi ∈ E i for i = 1, · · · , n}, with E i := {νi ∈ Πi : ∫R¯ni |x¯i|p′νi(dx¯i) ≤ Ci},
and note that E is Wp-compact.
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Step 2. We are going to show that the graph of p¯i ∈ E 7→ R(p¯i) is Wp-closed, i.e. given p¯im, p¯i∞ ∈ Π ∩ E ,
p¯i′m ∈ R(p¯im) such that p¯im → p¯i∞ in Wp and p¯i′m → p¯i′∞ ∈ Π, we want to show that p¯i′∞ ∈ R(p¯i∞).
Denote the concatenation of two probability measures νi ∈ Πi, µ−i ∈ Π−i by
νi ⊗ µ−i(dx, dy) = νi(xi|y)µ−i(x−i|y)dxm(dy).
Note that for p¯i, p¯i′ ∈ E we have p¯i′i ⊗ p¯i−i ∈ E . Since E is Wp-compact, there is a subsequence, still denoted
by (p¯im, p¯i
′
m), and p¯i
∗ ∈ Π ∩ E such that p¯i′im ⊗ p¯i−im → p¯i∗ in Wp and p¯i∗,i = p¯i′i∞, p¯i∗,−i = p¯i−i∞ . By the
lower-semicontinuity of the mapping: p¯i 7→ V i(p¯ii, p¯i−i), we have
(5.3) V i(p¯i′i∞, p¯i
−i
∞ ) = V
i(p¯i∗,i, p¯i∗,−i) ≤ lim inf
m→∞ V
i(p¯i′im, p¯i
−i
m ).
Further, fix νi ∈ Πi ∩ E i. Again by the compactness of E , there is a subsequence, still denoted by (νi, p¯i′m),
and p¯iν ∈ Π ∩ E such that νi ⊗ p¯i−im → p¯iν in Wp and p¯iν,i = νi, p¯iν,−i = p¯i−i∞ . Therefore
lim inf
m→∞ V
i(p¯i′im, p¯i
−i
m ) ≤ lim inf
m→∞ V
i(νi, p¯i−im ) = V
i(p¯iν,i, p¯iν,−i) = V i(νi, p¯i−i∞ ).
Together with (5.3), we conclude that p¯i
′i
∞ ∈ Ri(p¯i∞) for all i, and thus p¯i′∞ ∈ R(p¯i∞).
Step 3. From the condition of the theorem and the result of Step 1&2, we conclude that for any p¯i ∈ Π
the set R(p¯i) is non-empty, convex, that the set ∪p¯i∈ΠR(p¯i) is a subset of a Wp-compact set, and that the
graph of the mapping p¯i ∈ E 7→ R(p¯i) ⊂ E is Wp-closed. Therefore, it follows from the Kakutani fixed-point
theorem that the mapping p¯i 7→ R(p¯i) has a fixed point, which is a Nash equilibrium.
5.3. Invariant measure of MFL system.
Proof of Theorem 3.8. The proof is based on the Banach fixed point theorem. Given fixed (p¯it), (p¯i
′
t) ∈
Cp([0, T ],Π), the SDEs (2.2) apparently have unique strong solutions, denoted by X¯, X¯
′ respectively. Denote
by ˆ¯pit := Law(X¯t) and ˆ¯pi
′
t := Law(X¯
′
t). We are going to show that the mapping Ψ : p¯i 7→ ˆ¯pi is a contraction
as T is small enough.
First, by the standard SDE estimate we know E
[
supt∈[0,T ] |Xt|p
]
< ∞, and this implies (ˆ¯pit), (ˆ¯pi′t) ∈
Cp([0, T ],Π). Note the SDEs for X˜, X˜
′ share the same Brownian motion. Denoting δX = X −X ′, we have
|δXis|p =
∣∣∣∣∫ s
0
(
−∇xi δF
i
δν
(p¯iit, p¯i
−i
t , X
i
t , Y ) +∇xi
δF i
δν
(p¯i′it , p¯i
′−i
t , X
′i
t , Y )dt
)
dt
∣∣∣∣p
≤ T 1− 1p
(∫ s
0
C
(
Wpp (p¯iit, p¯i′it ) +Wpp (p¯i−it , p¯i′−it ) + |δXit′ |p
)
dt+
∫ s
0
C0Wpp (p¯i−it (·|Y ), p¯i′−it (·|Y ))dt
)
.
Taking expectation on both sides, by the Gronwall inequality we obtain that
E
[|δXys |p] ≤ CeCT ∫ T
0
(
Wpp (p¯it, p¯i′t) +Wpp (p¯it(·|y), p¯i′t(·|y))
)
dt.
Note that E
[|δXys |p] ≥ Wpp (ˆ¯pis(·|y), ˆ¯pi′s(·|y)). Therefore
Wpp (ˆ¯pis(·|y), ˆ¯pi′s(·|y)) ≤ CeCT
∫ T
0
(
Wpp (p¯it, p¯i′t) +Wpp (p¯it(·|y), p¯i′t(·|y))
)
dt.
Integrating both sides with respect to m, we obtain
Wpp(ˆ¯pit, ˆ¯pi′t) ≤ CeCT
∫ T
0
2Wpp(p¯it, p¯i′t)dt ≤ 2CTeCT sup
t∈[0,T ]
Wpp(p¯it, p¯i′t),
and Ψ is a contraction whenever T is small enough. In case C0 = 0 the result can be deduced similarly.
In order to prove Theorem 3.10, the main ingredient is the reflection coupling in Eberle [10]. For this
mean-field system, we shall adopt the reflection-synchronous coupling as in [11].
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We first recall the reflection-synchronous coupling. Fix a parameter ε > 0. Introduce the Lipschitz
functions rc : RN × RN → [0, 1] and sc : RN × RN → [0, 1] satisfying
sc2(x, x′) + rc2(x, x′) = 1, rc(x, x′) = 1 for |x− x′| ≥ ε, rc(x, x′) = 0 for |x− x′| ≤ ε/2.
Let p¯i0, p¯i
′
0 ∈ Π ∩ Pq(R¯N ) with some q > 1 be two initial distributions of the MFL system (2.2), and W, W˜
be two independent N -dimensional Brownian motions. It follows from Theorem 3.8 the two MFL systems
have strong solutions, and denote the marginal laws by p¯it, p¯i
′
t. Denote the drift of the dynamics (2.3) by
(5.4) by(t, x) :=
(
−∇xi δF
i
δν
(p¯iit, p¯i
−i
t , x
i, y)
)
i=1,··· ,n
, b˜y(t, x) :=
(
−∇xi δF
i
δν
(p¯i′it , p¯i
′−i
t , x
i, y)
)
i=1,··· ,n
Further, for a fixed y ∈ Y, define the coupling Σy = (Xy, X ′y) as the strong solution to the SDE
dXyt = b
y(t,Xyt )dt+ rc(Σ
y
t)σdWt + sc(Σ
y
t)σdW˜t,
dX ′yt = b˜
y(t,X ′yt )dt+ rc(Σ
y
t)
(
Id− 2et〈et, ·〉
)
σdWt + sc(Σ
y
t)σdW˜t,
where et :=
Xyt−X′yt
|Xyt−X′yt |
for Xyt 6= X ′yt , otherwise et := eˆ some arbitrary fixed unit vector in RN .
In the following proof, we will use the concave increasing function f constructed in [11, Theorem 2.3]:
f(r) :=
∫ r
0
ϕ(s)g(s ∧R2)ds, where g(r) := 1− c
2
∫ r
0
Φ(s)ϕ(s)−1ds,
and the function ϕ and the constants R2, c are defined in the statement of Theorem 3.10. In particular, on
(0, R2) ∪ (R2,+∞) the function f satisfies
2σ2f ′′(r) ≤ −r(κ(r) + 2γη(r))f ′(r)− cσ2f(r)(5.5)
and for r ∈ R+
rϕ(R1) ≤ Φ(r) ≤ 2f(r) ≤ 2Φ(r) ≤ 2r.(5.6)
Proof of Theorem 3.10. Note that pi0(·|y), pi′0(·|y) ∈ Pq(RN ) with q > 1 for m-a.s. y ∈ Y. For such y,
we may choose the coupling (Xy0, X
′y
0 ) so that
W1
(
pi0(·|y), pi′0(·|y)
)
= E
[|Xy0 −X ′y0 |] ≥ E[f(|Xy0 −X ′y0 |)].(5.7)
The last inequality is due to (5.6). On the other hand, for all t ≥ 0 we have
W1
(
pit(·|y), pi′t(·|y)
) ≤ E[|Xyt −X ′yt |] ≤ 2ϕ(R1)E
[
f
(|Xyt −X ′yt |)].(5.8)
Denote δXyt := X
y
t −X ′yt . By the definition of the coupling above, we have
dδXyt =
(
by(t,Xyt )− b˜y(t,X ′yt )
)
dt+ 2rc(Σyt)σetdW¯t,
where W¯t :=
∫ t
0
es · dWs is a one-dimensional Brownian motion. Denote rt := |δXyt | and note that by the
definition of rc we have rc(Σyt) = 0 whenever rt ≤ ε/2. Therefore,
drt = et ·
(
by(t,Xyt )− b˜y(t,X ′yt )
)
dt+ 2rc(Σyt)σdW¯t.
Then it follows from the Itoˆ-Tanaka formula and the concavity of f that
f(rt)− f(r0) ≤
∫ t
0
(
f ′(rs)es ·
(
by(s,Xys)− b˜y(s,X ′ys )
)
+ 2rc(Σys)
2σ2f ′′(rs)
)
ds+Mt,
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where Mt := 2
∫ t
0
rc(Σys)f
′(rs)σdW¯s is a martingale. Now note that
es ·
(
by(s,Xys)− b˜y(s,X ′ys )
) ≤ 1{rs≥ε}rsκ(rs) + 1{rs<ε}Cε+ γ(W1(p¯is, p¯i′s) +W1(pis(·|y), pi′s(·|y))).
Further, since f ′′ ≤ 0 and rc(Σys) = 1 whenever rs ≥ ε, we have
f(rt)− f(r0) ≤
∫ t
0
(
1{rs≥ε}
(
f ′(rs)rsκ(rs) + 2σ2f ′′(rs)
)
+ 1{rs<ε}Cε
+γf ′(rs)
(W1(p¯is, p¯i′s) +W1(pis(·|y), pi′s(·|y))))ds+Mt.
By taking expectation on both sides, we obtain∫
E
[
f(rt)− f(r0)
]
m(dy)
≤
∫ t
0
(∫
E
[
1{rs≥ε}
(
f ′(rs)rsκ(rs) + 2σ2f ′′(rs)
)
+ Cε
]
m(dy) + 2γf ′(rs)W1(p¯is, p¯i′s)
)
ds
≤
∫ t
0
(∫
E
[
− cσ2f(rs)1{rs≥ε} + Cε
]
m(dy) + 2γW1(p¯is, p¯i′s)
)
ds
≤
∫ t
0
(∫
E
[
− cσ2f(rs) + (C + cσ2)ε
]
m(dy) + 2γW1(p¯is, p¯i′s)
)
ds.
The second last inequality is due to (5.5). Together with (5.7) and (5.8), we obtain
ϕ(R1)
2
ecσ
2tW1
(
p¯it, p¯i
′
t
)−W1(p¯i0, p¯i′0) ≤ ecσ2t ∫ E[f(rt)]m(dy)− ∫ E[f(r0)]m(dy)
≤
∫ t
0
ecσ
2s
(
(C + cσ2)ε+ 2γW1(p¯is, p¯i′s)
)
ds.
This holds true for all ε > 0, so finally we obtain (3.5) by Gronwall’s inequality.
5.4. One player case. Throughout this subsection, we suppose that the assumptions in Theorem 3.11
hold true. Recall the drift function by defined in (5.4) with n = 1, i.e.
by(t, x) := −∇x δF
δν
(p¯it, x, y).
Under the assumption of Theorem 3.11 the function by is continuous in (t, x) and C3 in x for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Due to a classical regularity result in the theory of linear PDEs (see e.g. [18, p.14-15]), we obtain the following
result.
Lemma 5.1. Under the assumption of Theorem 3.11, the marginal laws (pit(·|y))t≥0 of the solution to
(2.3) are weakly continuous solutions to the Fokker-Planck equations:
∂tν = ∇x · (−byν + σ
2
2
∇xν) for y ∈ Y.(5.9)
In particular, we have that (t, x) 7→ pit(x|y) belongs to C1,2
(
(0,∞)× RN )).
The following results can be proved with the same argument as in Lemma 5.5-5.7 in [15], so the proof is
omitted.
Lemma 5.2. Fix a y ∈ Y and assume E[|Xy0|2] <∞, where we recall the Xy defined in (2.3). Denote by
Qσy the scaled Wiener measure1 with initial distribution pi0(·|y) and by (Ft)t≥0 the canonical filtration of the
Wiener space. Then
1Let B be the canonical process of the Wiener space and Q be the Wiener measure, then the scaled Wiener measure
Qσ := Q ◦ (σB)−1.
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(i) for any finite horizon T > 0, the law of the solution to (2.2), Π(·|y) := Law(Xy), is equivalent to
Qσy on FT and the relative entropy∫
ln
(dΠ(·|y)
dQσy
∣∣∣
FT
)
dνt = E
[ ∫ T
0
∣∣by(t,Xyt )∣∣2dt] < +∞.
(ii) the marginal law pit(·|y) admits a density s.t. pit(·|y) > 0 and H
(
pit(·|y)
)
< +∞ for t > 0.
(iii) the function lnpit(x|y) is continuous differentiable in x for t > 0, and for any t0 ∈ (0, t] it satisfies
∇x lnpit(x|y) = − 1
t0
E
[∫ t0
0
(
1− s∇xby(s,Xyt−t0+s)
)
dW t−t0s
∣∣∣Xyt = x] ,
where W t−t0s := Wt−t0+s −Wt−t0 and W is the Brownian motion in (2.3). In particular, for any
t∗ > 0 we have
C := sup
s≥t∗
∫
RN
∣∣∇x lnpis(x|y)∣∣2pis(x|y)dx < +∞,
and C only depends on t∗ and the Lipschitz constant of ∇xby with respect to x.
(iv) we have the estimates∫
RN
|∇x lnpit(x|y)|dx < +∞,
∫
RN
|x · ∇x lnpit(x|y)|dx < +∞ for all t > 0,
and
∫ t′
t
∫
RN
|∆xxpis(x|y)|dxds < +∞ for all t′ > t > 0,
and together with the integration by parts we obtain for all t′ > t > 0∫
RN
∆xx
δF
δν
(p¯it, x, y)pit(x|y)dx = −
∫
RN
∇x δF
δν
(p¯it, x, y) · ∇xpit(x|y)dx,(5.10) ∫ t′
t
∫
RN
∆xx
(
lnpis(x|y)
)
pis(x|y)dxds = −
∫ t′
t
∫
RN
|∇x lnpis(x|y)|2 pis(x|y)dxds.
The proof of Theorem 3.11 is based on the previous lemma and Itoˆ calculus.
Proof of Theorem 3.11. It follows from the Itoˆ-type formula [2, Theorem 4.14] and (5.10) that
dF (p¯it) =
∫
RN
(
−∣∣∇x δF
δν
(p¯it, x¯)
∣∣2 + σ2
2
Tr(∇2x
δF
δν
(p¯it, x¯))
)
p¯it(dx¯)dt
=
∫
RN
(
−|∇x δF
δν
(p¯it, x¯)|2 − σ
2
2
∇x δF
δν
(p¯it, x¯) · ∇xpit(x|y)
pit(x|y)
)
p¯it(dx)dt.(5.11)
On the other hand, by Itoˆ’s formula and the Fokker-Planck equation (5.9), we have
d log pit(Xt|y) =
(
σ2∇x · ∇xpit(Xt|y)
pit(Xt|y) +
σ2
2
∣∣∣∣∇xpit(Xt|y)pit(Xt|y)
∣∣∣∣2 −∇x · ∇x δFδν (p¯it, Xt, y)
)
dt+ dMt.
where M is a martingale on [t, T ] for any 0 < t < T . By taking expectation on both sides and using (5.10),
we obtain for t > 0:
dH(mt) = E
[
−σ
2
2
∣∣∣∣∇xpit(Xt|y)pit(Xt|y)
∣∣∣∣2 +∇x δFδν (p¯it, Xt, y) · ∇xpit(Xt|y)pit(Xt|y)
]
dt
=
∫
RN
(
−σ
2
2
∣∣∣∣∇xpit(x|y)pit(x|y)
∣∣∣∣2 −∇x δFδν (p¯it, x, y) ·
(∇xpit(x|y)
pit(x|y)
))
p¯i(x¯)dt.(5.12)
Summing up equations (5.11) and (5.12), we obtain (3.7).
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Let (p¯it)t≥0 be the flow of marginal laws of the solution of (2.2) given an initial law p¯i0. Define a dynamic
system S(t) [p¯i0] := p¯it. Due to the result of Theorem 3.11, we can view the function V as a Lyapunov function
of the dynamic system (St)t≥0, and then it is natural to prove Theorem 3.12 using LaSalle’s invariance
principle (see the following Proposition 5.4). However, V σ is not continuous (only lower-semicontinuous), in
particular, the mapping t 7→ V σ(p¯it) is not a priori continuous at +∞, which makes the proof non-trivial.
Here we follow the strategy first developed in [16] to overcome the difficulty. Define the ω-limit set:
ω(p¯i0) :=
{
p¯i ∈ Π : there exists tn → +∞ such that W2 (S(tn) [p¯i0] , p¯i)→ 0
}
.
Lemma 5.3. Assume that p¯i0 ∈ Π ∩ Pq(R¯N ) with q ≥ 2. Then for the solution to the MFL system (2.2)
we have
(5.13) sup
t≥0
∫
R¯N
|x¯|qp¯it(dx¯) <∞.
Proof. By Itoˆ formula, we obtain
d|Xyt |q = q|Xyt |q−2
(
−2Xyt ·
δF
δν
(p¯it, X
y
t , y) + σ
2q(q − 2 +N)
)
dt+ σq|Xyt |q−2Xyt · dWt.
By the linear growth assumption on δFδν and the dissipative condition (3.6), there is a constant M such that
d|Xyt |q ≤ q|Xyt |q−2
(
C − ε|Xyt |21{|Xyt |≥M}
)
dt+ σq|Xyt |q−2Xyt · dWt
≤ q|Xyt |q−2
(
(C + εM2)− ε|Xyt |2
)
dt+ σq|Xyt |q−2Xyt · dWt.
In particular, the constant C above does not depend on y. In case q = 2, by taking expectation on both
sides and using the Gronwall inequality, we obtain
(5.14) sup
t≥0
E[|Xyt |q] ≤ C
(
1 + E[|Xy0|q]
)
,
with q = 2. For q > 2, a similar inequality follows from the induction. The desired result (5.13) follows from
integrating with respect to m on both sides of the inequality.
Proposition 5.4 (Invariance Principle). Assume that p¯i0 ∈ Π∩Pq(R¯N ) with q > 2. Then the set ω(p¯i0)
is non-empty, compact and invariant, that is
(a) for any p¯i ∈ ω(p¯i0), we have S(t) [p¯i] ∈ ω(p¯i0) for all t ≥ 0;
(b) for any p¯i ∈ ω(p¯i0) and t ≥ 0, there exists p¯i′ ∈ ω(p¯i0) such that S(t) [p¯i′] = p¯i.
Proof. Note that
• the mapping p¯i0 7→ S(t) [p¯i0] is W2-continuous due to the stability on the initial law;
• the mapping t 7→ S(t) [p¯i0] belongs to C2
(
R+,Π
)
, due to Theorem 3.8;
• the set {S(t)[p¯i0], t ≥ 0} belongs to a W2-compact set, due to (5.13).
The rest follows the standard argument for Lasalle’s invariance principle (see e.g. [14, Theorem 4.3.3] or [16,
Proposition 6.5]).
Proof of Theorem 3.12. Step 1. Recall the set I defined in (3.8). We first prove the existence of a
converging subsequence towards a member in I. Since ω(p¯i0) is W2-compact and V is W2-lower semicontin-
uous, there is p¯i∗ ∈ argminp¯i∈ω(p¯i0) V (p¯i). By the backward invariance (b), given t > 0 there is ν ∈ ω(p¯i0) such
that S(t)[ν] = p¯i∗. By Theorem 3.11, we have
V
(S(t+ s)[ν]) ≤ V (S(t)[ν]) = V (p¯i∗), for all s > 0.
Further by the forward invariance (a), we know S(t+ s)[ν] ∈ ω(p¯i0), and by the optimality of p¯i∗ we obtain
V
(S(t+ s)[ν]) = V (p¯i∗). Again by Theorem 3.11, we get
0 =
dV
(S(t)[ν])
dt
= −
∫
R¯N
∣∣∣∣∇x δFδν (p¯i∗, x, y) + σ22 ∇x ln (pi∗(x|y))
∣∣∣∣2 p¯i∗(dx¯).
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Since p¯i∗ = S(t)[ν] is equivalent to Leb×m according to Lemma 5.2 (ii), we have p¯i∗ ∈ I. By the definition
of ω(p¯i0), there is a subsequence of (p¯it) converging towards p¯i
∗.
Step 2 (a). We first prove the result under the assumption (ii.a). Let (p¯itn)n be a sequence converging to
p¯i∗ in W2. Due to the estimate (5.14) and the fact that Y is countable, there is subsequence, still denoted
by (tn)n such that for each y ∈ Y, pitn(·|y) converges to a probability measure piy in W2. Then clearly
piy = pi∗(·|y) for m-a.s. y, and thus p¯itn(·|y)→ p¯i∗(·|y) in W2 for m-a.s. y. Note that
p¯i∗(x|y) = C exp
(
− 2
σ2
δF
δν
(p¯i∗, x, y)
)
,
in particular, p¯i∗(·|y) is log-semiconcave. By the HWI inequality (see [25, Theorem 3]) we have
(5.15)
∫ (
ln p¯itn(x|y)− ln p¯i∗(x|y)
)
p¯itn(dx|y) ≤ W2
(
p¯itn(x|y), p¯i∗(x|y)
) (√Iyn + CW2(p¯itn(x|y), p¯i∗(x|y))) ,
where Iyn is the relative Fisher information defined as
Iyn :=
∫ ∣∣∣∇x ln p¯itn(x|y)−∇x ln p¯i∗(x|y)∣∣∣2p¯itn(dx|y)
=
∫ ∣∣∣∇x ln p¯itn(x|y) + 2σ2∇x δFδν (p¯i∗, x, y)∣∣∣2p¯itn(dx|y)
≤ 2
∫ ∣∣∇x ln p¯itn(x|y)∣∣2p¯itn(dx|y) + C(1 + ∫ |x|2p¯itn(dx|y)),
where the last inequality is due to the linear growth of ∇x δFδν in x. It follows from Lemma 5.2 (iii) that
supn,y Iyn <∞. Integrate both sides of (5.15) with respect to m, and obtain
(5.16) H
(
p¯itn
∣∣p¯i∗) ≤ CW2(p¯itn , p¯i∗)(1 +W2(p¯itn , p¯i∗)).
The right hand side converges to 0 as n→∞ by the dominated convergence theorem. Therefore,
lim sup
n→∞
H(p¯itn |Leb×m)−H(p¯i∗|Leb×m)
= lim sup
n→∞
∫
ln
(
pitn(x|y)
pi∗(x|y)
)
p¯itn(dx¯) +
∫
ln
(
pi∗(x|y))(p¯itn − p¯i∗)(dx¯)
= lim sup
n→∞
H
(
p¯itn
∣∣p¯i∗) ≤ 0,
where the last equality is due to the dominated convergence theorem and the last inequality is due to (5.16).
Since H is W2-lower-semicontinuous, we have lim
n→∞H(p¯itn |Leb × m) = H(p¯i
∗|Leb × m). Together with the
fact that F is W2-continuous, we have lim
t→∞V (p¯it) = V (p¯i
∗). Further by the W2-lower-semicontinuity of V ,
we obtain
V (p¯i) ≤ lim
t′n→∞
V (p¯it′n) = V (p¯i
∗), for all p¯i ∈ ω(p¯i0).
Together with the optimality of p¯i∗, we have V (p¯i) = V (p¯i∗) for all p¯i ∈ ω(p¯i0). Finally by the invariant
principle and (3.7), we conclude that ω(p¯i0) ⊂ I.
Step 2 (b). Similarly we can prove the result under the assumption (ii.b). Let (p¯itn)n be a sequence con-
verging to p¯i∗ in W2. Note that
p¯i∗(x, y) = C exp
(
− 2
σ2
δF
δν
(p¯i∗, x, y)
)
m(y)
is log-semiconcave due to the assumption. Due to the HWI inequality, we have∫ (
ln p¯itn(x|y)− ln p¯i∗(x|y)
)
p¯itn(dx¯) ≤ W2
(
p¯itn , p¯i
∗) (√In + CW2(p¯itn , p¯i∗)) ,
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where In is the relative Fisher information defined as
In :=
∫ ∣∣∣∇x ln p¯itn(x|y)−∇x ln p¯i∗(x|y)∣∣∣2p¯itn(dx¯)
=
∫ ∣∣∣∇x ln p¯itn(x|y) + 2σ2∇x δFδν (p¯i∗, x, y)∣∣∣2p¯itn(dx¯)
≤ 2
∫ ∣∣∇x ln p¯itn(x|y)∣∣2p¯itn(dx¯) + C(1 + ∫ |x|2p¯itn(dx¯)).
Again by Lemma 5.2 (iii) we have supn In <∞. For the rest, we may follow the same lines of arguments in
Step 2 (a) to conclude the proof.
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